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NOTES

prosecution to be constitutional. In disposing of the instant case
the Court could simply have said, as did the lower courts, that
since the narcotics control act grants immunity from federal
prosecution, this case is controlled by United States v. Murdock,
and it would have been unnecessary to consider whether or not
it was constitutional to grant immunity from state prosecution
in this area. The instant case might be urged to support the position that the Murdock decision is open to question 28 but for the
fact that since the Ullmann decision the Court has continually
espoused the "two sovereignties" theory. 29 It may be that the
Court by-passed the Murdock rationale and seized upon both Ullmann and Reina to set the limits of Congress' power to grant
immunity from state prosecution.
Walter I. Lanier,Jr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEGREGATION OF FACILITIES USED BY AN
INTERSTATE Bus LINE
Petitioner, a Negro, was travelling by interstate bus through
the South. During a stopover he entered a terminal restaurant
and found that it was segregated into white and colored sections.
Disregarding the division, petitioner sat down in the white section where he was refused service and was eventually arrested
by an officer upon request of the proprietor. He was subsequently convicted and fined $10.00 in the Police Justice's Court of
Richmond for violating a Virginia trespass law. The terminal
restaurant which petitioner entered was leased by the Trailways
Bus Terminal, Inc., a Virginia corporation, to the manager of
the restaurant. The lease provided that the operation of the
restaurant should be in keeping with the character of service of
a modern bus terminal.' Petitioner appealed to the city court of
28. That the Murdock holding is open to question is especially true in light of
the following extract taken from the majority opinion in the instant case (81
Sup. Ct. 260, 262) : "Both courts below passed the question whether the statute
grants state immunity because, assuming only federal immunity is granted, they
held that United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 52 S. Ct. 63, 76 L. Ed. 210,
settled that the Fifth Amendment does not protect a federal witness from answering questions which might incriminate him under state law. D.C., 170 F. Supp. at
page 595; 2 Cir., 273 F.2d at page 235. Petitioner contends that Murdock should
be re-examined and overruled. We have no occasion to consider this contention,
since in our view § 1406 constitutionally grants immunity from both federal and
state prosecutions." (Emphasis added.)
29. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) ; Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121 (1959) ; Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
1. Actually, this was only one provision in the lease. The majority opinion
summarized the lease provisions as follows: "Terminal covenanted to lease this
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Richmond, claiming that discrimination based on color violated
the Interstate Commerce Act, the equal protection, due process,
and commerce clauses of the Constitution. His motion to dismiss
on these grounds was overruled and he appealed to the Virginia
Supreme Court, charging only discrimination in violation of the
commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment. After the conviction was affirmed, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the issue of whether the conviction violated the
commerce, due process, and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, but decided that there were "persuasive ' 2 reasons why
the case should be decided on the Interstate Commerce Act
rather than the constitutional grounds presented in the petition
for certiorari,8 and held, conviction reversed. The discriminaspace to Restaurant for its use; to grant Restaurant the exclusive right to sell
foods and other things usually sold in restaurants, news stands, soda fountains
and lunch counters; to keep the terminal building in good repair and to furnish
certain utilities. Restaurant on its part agreed to use its space for the sale of
commodities agreed on at prices that are 'just and reasonable'; to sell no commodities not usually sold or installed in a bus terminal concession without
Terminal's permission; to discontinue the sale of any commodity objectionable
to Terminal; to buy, maintain, and replace equipment subject to Terminal's
approval in writing as to its quality; to make alterations and additions only
after Terminal's written consent and approval; to make no 'sales on buses
operating in and out said bus station' but only 'through the windows of said
buses'; to keep its employees neat and clean; to perform no terminal service
other than that pertaining to the operations of its restaurant as agreed on; and
that neither Restaurant nor its employees were to 'sell transportation of any
kind or give information pertaining to schedules, rates or transportation matters,
but shall refer all such inquiries to the proper agents of' Terminal." Boynton v.
Virginia, 81 Sup. Ct. 182, 186-87 (1960).
2. Id. at 184.
3. Supreme Court Rule 23(1) (c) provides: "The petition for writ of certiorari shall contain in the order here indicated "The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and circumstances
of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement of a question presented
will be deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein. Only
the questions set forth in the petition or fairly comprised therein will be considered
by the court." (Emphasis added.)
In numerous cases the Supreme Court has indicated that it will not decide
the constitutional issues in a case where such a decision is unnecessary. E.g.,
Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911). However, it would appear in view
of Supreme Court Rule 23(1) (c) that when a case is before the Court on
certiorari, it is proper for the Court to leave the constitutional issue undecided
only if other questions on which the case may be decided have been presented in
the petition for certiorari, or if the other questions can be found to be fairly comprised in the constitutional issue actually presented. Apparently the majority of
the Court in the instant case felt that the question of whether the conviction was
in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act was fairly comprised in the problem
of whether the conviction was in violation of the commerce clause, and the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The Court
pointed out that "discrimination because of color is the core of the two broad
constitutional questions presented to us by petitioner, just as it is the core of the
Interstate Commerce Act question presented to the Virginia Courts." Boynton v.
Virginia, 81 Sup. Ct. 182, 184 (1960). The dissenting Justices disagreed, being
of the opinion that no question under the Interstate Commerce Act was properly
before the Court for consideration. Id. at 188. Thus, assuming that the issue
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tion violated the Interstate Commerce Act since the terminal and
restaurant operated as an "integral" part of the bus carrier's
transportation service for interstate passengers, the act prohibiting discrimination by such terminals and restaurants. Boynton
v. Virginia, 81 Sup. Ct. 182 (1960).
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution confers upon Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.5
As a corollary when Congress acts in a particular area of interstate commerce the states are no longer free to legislate in the
same area." However, where Congress has refrained from
acting, and thus not pre-empted the field, residual power is said
to rest in the states to legislate on local matters, even though
interstate commerce may be affected.7 Yet, even where Congress
has not acted, state legislation is prohibited which substantially
impedes the free flow of interstate commerce or which acts in
an area which demands a single uniform authority." Thus the
states have been prohibited from enacting segregation laws
concerning passenger use of an interstate carrier's facilities
on the ground that this is a subject which requires a single
uniform rule which only Congress can provide.9
In enacting the Interstate Commerce Act Congress prohibited
an interstate carrier from discriminating in the use of facilities
which it furnished. Section 3(1) of that act, which applies to
railroad carriers, prohibits giving any undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage to any particular person.10 Common
under the Interstate Commerce Act was fairly comprised in the constitutional
questions presented in the petition for certiorari, one persuasive reason that the
Court refused to base the decision on constitutional grounds may have been the
accepted proposition that the court will avoid a decision on a constitutional issue
when the case can be decided on other grounds. However, due to the seemingly
strained interpretation given the Interstate Commerce Act by the Court, discussed
hereafter, it does not appear to this writer that justification for not deciding the
constitutional questions can be explained merely in terms of the fact that the
Court will not decide constitutional issues where it is unnecessary to do so.
4. Boynton v. Virginia, 81 Sup. Ct. 182, 184 (1960).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, provides in part: "The Congress shall have power
. to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian Tribes."
6. See, e.g., Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
However, the states may be free to act in an area where Congress has acted if the
federal and state law may be reconciled so that they can stand together. DOwLING,
CoN TiTuTIoNAL LAW 562 (6th ed. 1959).
7. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851); Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
8. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
9. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) ; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485
(1878).
10. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1958) provides: "It shall be
unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter to
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carriers by motor vehicle engaged in interstate commerce are

subject to a similar provision in Section 216(d).1

The act fur-

ther provides that facilities furnished by a carrier are those
which are operated or controlled by it.12 Under the section of
the act dealing with railroads, it has been held that discrimination by a carrier between Negroes and whites in the furnishing

of dining facilities is unlawful, 13 the United States Supreme
Court indicating that a railroad might not be required to furnish facilities; but if they did there could be no discrimination

in the use by interstate passengers.

4

The Interstate Commerce

Commission classified a railroad-owned hotel and restaurant

facility necessary for the convenience of passengers as a carrier
itself,15 but refused to find that a restaurant leased by a carrier
to a private company was such a "carrier" since the lessor's
power of supervision was so limited that the restaurant could

not be considered an "integral part" of its passenger service.is
make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever; or to subject any particular person . . .
to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
11. 49 STAT. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §316(d) (1958), provides: "It shall be
unlawful for any common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, . . . in any respect whatsoever; or to subject
any particular person . . . to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
12. 49 STAT. 544 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §303(a)(19) (1958) provides: "The
'services' and 'transportation' to which this chapter applies include all vehicles
operated by, for, or in the interest of any motor carrier irrespective of ownership
or of contract, express or implied, together with allfecilities and property operated
or controlled by any such carrier or carriers, and used in the transportation of
passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce or in the performance of
any service in connection therewith." (Emphasis added.)
13. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) ; Mitchell v. United
States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
14. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 97 (1941).
15. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 135 I.C.C. 633 (1928).
16. NAACP v. St. Louis-Santa Fe Ry., 297 I.C.C. 335, 343 (1955). The
Commission stated: "The lease is silent as to racial segregation. The terminal has
certain powers of supervision for a purpose which may be described as policing.
The lessee is obligated to 'comply with the requirements of the Department of
Public Health, City of Richmond, and with all other lawful governmental rules
and regulations.' The context however, indicates that this requirement is for the
purpose of keeping the premises in a neat, clean, and orderly condition, and does
not render the lessee liable for violations of the Interstate Commerce Act.
"In our decisions dealing with redcap service performed at railway terminals
in large cities for which a definite charge is imposed, we have distinguished that
service from the lunch-counter service, bootblack stand, newspaper and periodicals
sales service, checkroom and parcel lockers services, and taxicab concessions,
offered by carriers as matters of convenience and comfort to all persons who care
to become patrons of the carriers for the purpose. . . . Here, the lunchroom concession does not constitute an integral part of the passenger service performed by
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In the instant case the Court avoided a decision on the constitutional issues presented in the petition for certiorari, and
decided the case under the Interstate Commerce Act. The Court
held that facilities regulated by the act are those which are an
integral part of the interstate carrier's transportation service.
In so doing the Court apparently substituted "integral" for the
word "control," which is used in the section of the act specifying7
the facilities that are to be considered services of the carrier.'
It was apparently on this point that the dissenting Justices
took issue, indicating that they disagreed that "a motor carrier's
regular 'use' of a restaurant, though it be 'neither own[ed],
control[led] nor operated by the motor carrier, makes the
restaurant a facility' operated or controlled by [the motor]
carrier or carriers within the meaning of section 203(a) (19)
of the Interstate Commerce Act.'

8

In the final analysis, the question must arise as to why the
Court would resort to a seemingly extended interpretation of
the Interstate Commerce Act to encompass the facts of the
instant case, instead of deciding the constitutional questions
presented in the petition for certiorari. Since the commerce
clause delineates the powers of Congress and the states, and
expressly provides that Congress shall have the power to regulate interstate commerce, it appears that a decision under that
clause would be directed to the question of whether certain state
the defendants." (Emphasis added.)
Although the Commission used the term "integral" in describing what would
be necessary to make the restaurant service that of the carrier, it was apparently
not used in the same context as employed by the Court in the instant case.
According to the instant decision the Interstate Commerce Act covers all facilities
that are an integral part of the carrier service, and it can become an integral part
without the necessity of control. As used by the Interstate Commerce Commission
it would be necesary to find that the carrier had some control over the facility
before it could be considered an integral part of the carrier's service. It appears
that the dissent in the Boynton case recognized this distinction when, in citing
the NAACP v. St. Louis d Santa Fe By. case, they stated that mere use does
not make the restaurant a facility operated or controlled by the carrier and that
they were of the opinion that the Interstate Commerce Commission recognized
and correctly applied this principle. Boyton v. Virginia, 81 Sup. Ct. 182, 190
(1960).
17. Boynton v. Virginia, 81 Sup. Ct. 182, 186 (1960). The Court stated:
"Respondent correctly points out, however, that, whatever may be the facts, the
evidence in this record does not show that the bus company owns or actively
controls the bus terminal or the restaurant in it. But the fact that Section
203(a) (19) says that the protections of the motor carrier provisions of the Act
extend to 'include' facilities so operated or controlled by no means should be
interpreted to exempt motor carriers from their statutory duty under section
216(d) not to discriminate should they choose to provide their interstate passengers with services that are an integral part 6f transportation through the use
of facilities they neither own, control nor operate." (Emphasis added.)
18. Id. at 190.
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legislation is an unlawful regulation of interstate commerce.
In the instant case the state legislation involved would be the
trespass law as applied to the facts. If the Court had decided
that this was an unlawful regulation of interstate commerce, the
effect would have been to deny the state power to invoke laws
to aid an individual in his racial discrimination when that individual was involved in interstate commerce. However, the
individual himself could still discriminate since a decision under
the commerce clause would enjoin only the state. Thus it seems
that the ultimate effect would be to allow private discrimination
without state aid, which would mean that the individual involved
could carry out his discrimination through private means, whatever they might be, with no law on which to rely to effectuate
his right.19
If the instant decision had been rendered under the fourteenth amendment, the recent group of cases involving the
so-called "sit-in" demonstrations, in effect, would have been
decided. Those cases raise the question of whether state aid
of private discrimination is unlawful state action under the
fourteenth amendment. They commonly arise when an individual
refuses service on the basis of color and the state aids the individual in his discrimination by enforcing a trespass law or
similar statute.2 0 As yet, it is not clear whether such aid is
unlawful and the Court appears reluctant to settle the issue.
If state enforcement of private discrimination is held to be
unlawful state action, then again the somewhat anomalous situation could arise where the individual is allowed to discriminate
19. Self-help might be encouraged even more by the fact that thus far the
Supreme Court has refused to find state action where a private person effectuates
his own desire to discriminate and then is sued by the person who is discriminated
against and is upheld in his discrimination by the state court. See Rice v. Sioux
City Memorial Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954). "Suppose, in the typical 'sit-in'
situation, that the owner of the property, instead of seeking the assistance of the
state to vindicate his right to discriminate, chooses to utilize self-help for that
purpose, that is, to use reasonable force to remove the Negro from his premises.
If the Negro subsequently sues him for assault and battery or causes a criminal
proceeding to be initiated, and the defendant pleads a privilege to use reasonable
force to remove a trespasser, the court's action in sustaining the defense would not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
"If private implementation of the right to discriminate is permissible in a
trespass-to-real-property situation arising out of a 'sit-in', but the Court holds
that affirmative state vindication of that right by imposing a criminal sanction is
not, it will thereby encourage the use of a self-help, a situation hardly calculated to
improve either race relations or the maintenance of law and order." Louisiana
Legislative Symposium-Race Relations, 21 LoUISIANA LAw REviEW 85, 97
(1960).
20. For a thorough discussion of the problem of state action under the fourteenth amendment, see Comment, 21 LouiSIANA LAw REvxxw 433 (1961).
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if he can effectuate such discrimination himself. It appears that
such position would put a premium on self-help. Thus, perhaps
it may be concluded that the "persuasive reasons" why the Court
did not consider the constitutional questions in the instant case
stemmed from the fact that it did not approve of the discrimination here involved, but yet was reluctant to condemn it as unconstitutional because of the complications inherent in such a
decision.
Hillary J. Crain

INCOME TAXATION -

DEPRECIATION OF AN ASSET NOT USED FOR

ITS FULL ECONOMIC LIFE
The United States Supreme Court in three cases decided
during the last term has defined the concepts of "useful life"
and "salvage value" as applied to depreciable property that is
sold prior to exhaustion of its full economic life. A hypothetical
case will serve to illustrate the situation presented in two of
these cases.1 During the taxable years in question, 1950 and
1951, taxpayer sold cars which he had previously purchased
for use in his business. The cars had an original cost of $1,600
each, and taxpayer depreciated them by the straight line method,
2
taking a useful life of four years and a salvage value of zero.
After using the cars for less than two years, he sold them for
$1,400 each. During this period $500 per car was deducted as
depreciation, leaving a net profit of $300 per car. A total of
290 cars were sold in the two years, at a profit of $87,000, which
was treated as a capital gain. The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue contended that for depreciation purposes, useful life
was the period over which the taxpayer actually used the cars
in his trade or business, and salvage value was their actual
resale value. Therefore, the taxpayer could have deducted only
1. The figures in the hypothetical case approximate those as set out in Evans
v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1959).
2. This is the most common method of depreciation. The annual allowance is
computed by this formula:
original cost - salvage value (if any)
useful life
In the hypothetical case:

$1600-0 $400 per year per car
4 years
See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-1 (1956).
3. Net profit=Resale Price-Adjusted Basis [Cost-Depreciation Taken].
In the hypothetical case Net Profit--$1400- ($1600-$500)=$300.

